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ABSTRACT Prediction markets are designed to aggregate the information of many individ-
uals to forecast future events.Thesemarkets provide participants with an incentive to seek
information and a forum for interaction, making markets a promising tool to motivate
student learning. We carried out a quasi-experiment in an introductory political science
class to study the eﬀect of prediction markets on student engagement with the course
topics. Although we found no signiﬁcant improvement in students’ enthusiasm or extent
of topical reading, we did ﬁnd that those students whowere already reading broadly at the
course start were more likely to trade actively in the markets. These ﬁndings indicate that
prediction markets may be most successful as an education tool in settings, like graduate
education, where individuals are already knowledgeable about the topics of the market,
instead of an introductory learning context.
Prediction markets (also known as information mar-kets or decision markets) are designed to aggregatethe informationofmany individuals to forecast futureevents. Such markets have been used in a variety ofcontexts. For example, the Iowa Electronic Market
forecasts political and economic events including election out-
comes, and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency’s
(DARPA) proposed Policy Analysis Market was intended to fore-
cast world political, economic, and military actions. The motiva-
tion for using markets for forecasting is that traders reveal some
privately held information through the trades they carry out, and
themarket price aggregates the informationof uncoordinated trad-
ers through a “wisdomof crowds” eﬀect.Thesemarkets have been
shown to closely approximate the predictive capabilities of public
polls and expert opinions (Wolfers andZitzewitz 2004).They have
been studied for their eﬀect on public policy choices (Hahn and
Tetlock 2003), predictive abilities (Servan-Schreiber et al. 2004),
and accuracy in the face of severely limited information (Forsythe
et al. 1992).
Prediction markets, however, have not been studied for their
eﬀect on traders themselves. Pedagogically, these markets are
part of a larger trend in education toward including interactive
and technological resources in the classroom (Buckley, Garvey,
andMcGrath 2011). Among the key advantages of predictionmar-
kets, researchers have noted that they provide incentives to moti-
vate traders to “ferret out accurate information” and “not amplify
individual errors, but eliminate them” (Sunstein 2006). These
strengths alignwell with our goals as instructors: wewant to train
our students to search for relevant information and critically ana-
lyze received information.
Prediction markets can be a useful in-class teaching tool for a
variety of political science subﬁelds, including American elec-
tions and campaigns (Abramson 2010) and public policy (Wolfers
andZitzewitz 2004). In the Iowa ElectronicMarkets, for example,
the greatest volume of trading occurs prior to the presidential
primary and general elections, and instructors may be interested
in using prediction markets in the classroom as early as the fall
term of 2011 (i.e., the time leading up to the ﬁrst primaries of 2012
in Iowa and New Hampshire). Prediction markets also provide
interesting information for professors of comparative politics about
a variety of international elections (for example, InTrade hosted a
market about the presidential elections of Brazil in 2010). Yet,
until now, we are unaware of any controlled studies of the use of
prediction markets as learning tools.
We carried out a quasiexperiment in an introductory political
science class at a large midwestern university to study the eﬀect
of prediction markets on student engagement with the course
material. We used a prediction market website, built around the
open-source Zocalo software, and created markets relevant to the
topic of the course (world politics, for the study reported here).
We intentionally pickedmarkets that were tangential rather than
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central to the class syllabus because we did not want to give a
subset of students an advantage in class performance. We con-
ducted surveys of the entire class at the start and end of the course,
with questions intended to measure their engagement with the
course topic as well as their knowledge of speciﬁc topics. We
selected a random group of students to be invited to trade in the
market, tracked their individual participation, and provided small
monetary rewards based on performance.
The results on the eﬀects of prediction markets on student
enthusiasm were disappointing: We detected no signiﬁcant
improvement in students’ enthusiasm for the topics of the course
or extent of extra reading among students who traded in the
markets relative to the control group. However, a deeper analy-
sis revealed that, among the students who were eligible to trade,
those who chose to trade actively had a signiﬁcantly higher prior
level of reading in the area. In other words, the students who
were already reading broadly at the start of the course were more
likely to trade actively in the market. Active traders self-reported
a high level of satisfaction with the prediction markets. Our ﬁnd-
ings are consistent with those of Whitton (2007), who cautions
that not all students are receptive to interactive technology in
the classroom, warning that, “the sole reason for using [computer-
based games] should not be because they are perceived to be
motivational.” Our results suggest that instructors may beneﬁt
from using prediction markets to engage students with selected
topics, but should do cautiously: this tool is enjoyable and useful
for some students, but it does not appear to motivate the entire
spectrum of students.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: First, we
outline observations from our earlier pilot experiments that led
to conclusions about how to motivate participation in markets.
Second, we describe our experimental methodology. Third, we
present descriptive statistics of our student population. Next, we
provide reports on our data analysis procedures and the results of
this analysis. Finally, we discuss the insights yielded by this anal-
ysis, the limitations of this study, and interesting directions for
future research.
TWO-PHASE PILOT STUDY
A pilot study was carried out in the spring semester of 2009 to
gather baseline data about participation in and response to deci-
sion markets in a pedagogical setting. This pilot used customized
online predictionmarkets in a large undergraduate course onworld
politics. Our original primary hypothesis was that participation
in prediction markets would increase students’ enthusiasm for
the topic of world politics. We supposed that students would
research the market topics to increase their information advan-
tage and the likelihood of receiving cash rewards. In our pilot
phase, 166 studentswere randomly divided into treatment (trader)
and control (nontrader) groups. Presurveys and postsurveys were
conducted with both groups at semester start and ﬁnish. Treated
students (traders) were allowed to trade in the market with vir-
tual points. Surveys at the beginning and end of the semester
evaluated student enthusiasm for the subject matter. Unfortu-
nately, we only obtained a 7% compliance rate among the treated
(6 traders), despite 92% awareness of the potential for cash prizes.
We also found underreporting of treatment status by more than
half (i.e., students assigned to be traders did not report that they
knew they were in the treatment group; 41 reported treatment, 83
actually treated). Low compliance among the treatment group, a
feature typical of experimental studies of predictionmarkets (For-
sythe et al. 1992;Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004), limited our ability
to make inferences from the pilot study.
As a result, in fall 2009, we performed a nonrandomized study
in a smaller (N  22) elective upperlevel undergraduate course
that focused on war in international relations. We changed the
interface and markets, implemented a diﬀerent incentive struc-
ture, and administeredmoredetailed and indepth surveys to under-
stand what students claim would be motivating to them. We
collected unique identiﬁers to create a panel dataset including
both survey responses and trading behavior.We also developed a
new quiz about topics related exclusively to the markets to deter-
mine changes in knowledge levels at the subject level. Finally, we
introduced students to the prediction market experiment using a
live in-class demonstration, during which they were able to ask
the researchers questions. Both phases of the pilot study informed
the design of our ﬁnal experiment, which is reported later in this
article.
METHODOLOGY
For the data reported here, we used a nonequivalent comparison
group design, a quasiexperimental design using both control
groups and pretests as per Shadish, Cook, and Campbell (2002).
Using a computer algorithm, students were randomized over the
entire class into treatment (trader) and control (nontrader) groups.
At the start of the semester, we administered an in-class pretest
survey, pretest knowledge quiz, and statement of informed con-
sent to each student. We explained the purpose of the research
and provided a live demonstration of the market interface pro-
jected on a large screen using a simple example market of a major
movie’s likelihood of winning an Academy Award (Oscar). Based
on the feedback from the students in the second phase of our
pilot study, we expressed enthusiasm about the project and asked
students directly for their help.With the permission of the instruc-
tor, we also developed an extra credit question for one of the mid-
term exams. To ensure fairness and address potential concerns
about diﬀusion, both treatment and control groups were given
access to view the markets via the experimental website to learn
the information needed for the extra-credit question. However,
only the treated group was given access to trade in the market for
cash prizes. At the end of the semester, all students were provided
with a posttest survey and posttest knowledge quiz. Surveys and
Our results suggest that instructors may beneﬁt from using prediction markets to engage
students with selected topics, but should do cautiously: this tool is enjoyable and useful for
some students, but it does not appear to motivate the entire spectrum of students.
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quizzes were administered in class, on paper, to ensure a greater
level of participation than often occurs with web-based surveys.
As there was some attrition of students who did not attend the
last class session, we report results only for the 129 students for
whom we collected a complete panel of information.
Speciﬁcation Checks
Speciﬁcation checks, using an independent two-tailed groupmeans
t-test, with an assumption of unequal variances and the Satterth-
waite approximation of degrees of freedom, indicated that the
randomization process produced two groups that were generally
equivalent on survey questions and quiz performance. Thus, the
groups were likely to be equivalent on other unobservable
characteristics.
Market Topics
By deﬁnition, prediction markets are about current events with
future uncertainty. Therefore, we created 10 markets with topics
that ﬁt the general content of an introductoryworld politics course.
(See table 1.) We attempted to select a range of relevant topics
that would be of interest to a variety of students, and included a
market with only a tangential connection to world politics—the
2010Winter Olympics—to get students interested in trading on a
topic of general interest.
Market Structure and Interface
We provided a market built using Zocalo, an open-source soft-
ware package for running predictionmarkets. In prior trials, how-
ever, we found this trading interface to be slightly complex for
new traders.Hence,we implemented a custom-user interface using
the Drupal open-source application platform. In addition to pro-
viding a simple trading interface, we included a sidebar in which
students could see a news feed consisting of recent headlines rel-
evant to the market and a comment box.
Students in the treatment group received a budget of 1,000
virtual points at the start of the semester to buy and sell securities
based on the market topics. For each of the market topics, there
were two securities: a “yes” security that eventually paid oﬀ one
virtual point if the event happened, and a “no” security that paid
one point if the event did not happen by the closing date. Stu-
dents could use their point balances to buy or sell shares of either
“yes” or “no” for the event to drive the price to a point that they
thought was correct. For simplicity, we gave students the option
of buying and selling shares in blocks of 10 or 100 points, with an
accompanying comment about the meaning of the transaction
(see ﬁgure 1). Each market had a closing date that could be either
the date of the supposed future event (for example, elections in
Haiti that were scheduled to be held on February 28, 2010), a date
in the middle of the term chosen by the researchers, or the end of
the term. It was important to have some markets close in the
middle of the term, as the students’ correct predictions in such a
market could generate additional points to be used for trading in
anothermarket. In other words, their balances could increase and
they could trademore andmore frequently if theywished, or bank
their “winnings” for the cash prize payout.
Students did not directly trade securities with each other;
instead, we used a format in which an (automated) market maker
buys securities from students who want to sell, and sells securi-
ties to students who want to buy. The market maker quotes a
price at each point in time, and adjusts the prices for each security
bought or sold. We used the market scoring rule market maker
introduced by Hanson (2003). Using a market maker is very help-
ful in thin market settings such as those we had: it eliminates the
need for a buyer and seller to be simultaneously interested in trad-
ing, and it allows instantaneous trades to take place at any time.
A market maker also reduces the strategic complexity for traders
and has attractive incentive properties (Hanson 2003).
Incentive Structure
Students were told that their trading account with 1,000 points
would translate into cash at the end of the semester at a rate of
1 cent per point (for an eﬀective cash balance of $10) but the cash
could only be collected if the students logged in and executed at
least one trade. Of the 66 students in the treatment group for
whom we were able to collect a full panel, 45 logged in to trade,
and 21 did not. Only three students executed only one trade and,
of those, only one student actually picked up the cash prize. The
mean number of trades was 29.16 and the mean number of ﬁnal
points was 1052.02. Students were told at the beginning of the
semester that their balance could go up or down depending on
the success of their trading activity. In other words, trades based
on more accurate predictions would be rewarded with a higher
cash payout, and poor predictions could mean that students end
up with less than their original $10 balance. Seventeen students
ended upwith point balances lower than their initial endowments.
Communication with Students
We sent a number of e-mails to students in the treatment group
to facilitate communication. Each e-mail was written in an enthu-
siastic tone, reminded students to trade in the market, provided
the direct link to the market, as well as the current trading price
and volume for selected markets. The e-mails also included links
to news stories about selected markets and a commentary on the
trend of trading behavior. The e-mails were carefully written to
Table 1
Market Topics
• Iran will conduct a nuclear weapons test on or before April 15, 2010.
• Israelwill announcea total freeze in settlement constructiononorbefore
April 15, 2010.
• Osama Bin Laden will be captured or neutralized on or before March
31, 2010.
• Cubawill be removed fromUSState Department list of State Sponsors
of Terrorism on or before February 15, 2010.
• The Prime Minister of Japan will visit the Yasukuni Shrine by March 1,
2010.
• The trial for Khalid SheikhMohammedwill begin in the US on or before
April 15, 2010.
• Palestinian PresidentMahmoudAbbaswill be announced thewinner in
the Palestinian elections by January 31, 2010.
• Google will announce that it has ceased all operations in China on or
before April 15, 2010.
• Legislative elections in Haiti will be held on schedule on February 28,
2010.
• Germany will win the largest number of goldmedals in the 2010Winter
Olympics.
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take a tone that would encourage students to trade in the selected
markets, but not inﬂuence trading one way or the other.
Knowledge Quizzes and Surveys
Allstudents—inboththetreatmentandcontrolgroups—completed
“KnowledgeQuizzes” at the beginning and end of the semester to
gauge if learning had occurred on topics relevant to the markets.
Thequiz at the start of the semester consisted of 24questionswith
threeoptions—true, false, or “Idon’tknow.”Studentswereencour-
aged toanswer“Idon’tknow” if they trulydidnotknowtheanswer
to discourage false positive responses. In addition to the Knowl-
edgeQuizzes, students ﬁlled out surveys that elicited information
about their background, their enthusiasm for the course topic, and
thesources theyreliedonfor information.For the treatmentgroup,
theﬁnalsurveyhadadditionalquestionstogaugethestudents’own
perceptions of the prediction markets and their reasons for trad-
ing or not trading.Thedescriptive statistics from the initial survey
and knowledge quiz are detailed next.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FROM INITIAL KNOWLEDGE
QUIZ AND SURVEY
Here, we report values for the overall population of the study,
with speciﬁcation checks indicating the results of two-tailed t-tests
formeandiﬀerences betweennontrader (control) and trader (treat-
ment) groups in parentheses unless otherwise indicated. For exam-
ple, the class was 44% female ( Sxcontrol  0+4677, Sxtreated  0+4179,
6t 6  0+5654, p  0+5728). P-values exceeding our preferred  
0.05 indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
diﬀerence ofmeans between traders and nontraders is zero, while
an  less than 0.05 indicates a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in the means for the two groups.
Knowledge Quiz
Wepresent an overview of the salient features of the initial knowl-
edge quiz. We noted that there was a high negative correlation
between correct answers and the number of students answering
“I don’t know”—in otherwords, students did not generally attempt
to answer questions for which they did not know the correct
answer, consistent with our intentions in developing the quiz. All
questions were based on prediction market topics. There was no
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in mean performance between the control
and treatment groups for the initial quiz ( Sxcontrol0+3031, Sxtreated
0+3377, 6t 6  1+2861, p  0+2008). The knowledge quizzes at the
end of the semester included the same questions as well as three
additional questions on current events topics not part of the exper-
iment (the revolution in Kyrgyzstan, earthquake in Chile, and
coup of the president of Niger) to assess if traders gained a greater
overall understanding of events of world politics.
MSLQ Survey Questions—Cognitive andMeta-Cognitive
Strategies
To control for intrinsic motivation, we administered a modiﬁed
version of the Motivated Strategies for Learning Questionnaire
(MSLQ, from Pintrich et al. 1993), speciﬁcally the section, “Cog-
nitive and Meta-Cognitive Strategies: Self-Regulation.” As used
in educational research, theMSLQ locates students who aremore
Figure 1
Screenshot of Market Interface
Note: This screenshot was taken long after the market trading period, and hence the headlines shown here are not identical to those read to the subjects.
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likely to “usemore deep-processing strategies such as elaboration
and organization and who attempt to control their cognition and
behavior through the use of metacognitive planning, monitoring,
and regulating strategies [and] are more likely to do better in
their course assignments, exams, and papers as well as overall
course grade” (Duncan and McKeachie 2005). The mean MLSQ
score for the class overall was 3.6843 out of 7.
Survey Questions on DependentVariables of Interest:
Enthusiasm, Outside Reading, and Knowledge
As we were primarily interested in how trading in a prediction
marketwould improve students’ knowledge of and interest in polit-
ical science, our key dependent variables of interest pertained to
enthusiasm, outside reading onworld politics, and general knowl-
edge of world politics. Using a 7-point Likert scale to measure
student’s enthusiasm for world politics, we found an initial aver-
age level of enthusiasm of 5.6202 ( Sxcontrol5+6290, Sxtreated5+6119,
6t 60+0763, p0+9393), corresponding to a point between “slightly
enthusiastic” and “fairly enthusiastic.” We also asked if students
read news about the politics of other countries at least once a
week in a newspaper or on the Internet. Almost 70% of students
indicated that they did ( Sxcontrol  0+6613, Sxtreated  0+7313, 6t 6 
0+8591, p 0+3919), which may indicate a selection eﬀect for stu-
dents who elect this speciﬁc course. The knowledge quiz was the
ﬁnal component of interest, measuring actual student knowledge
about the topic(s) and not just student enthusiasm.
RESULTS
In this section, we present results on the eﬀect of student expo-
sure, obtained by comparing the initial and ﬁnal surveys and
knowledge quizzes of control (nontrader) and treatment (trader)
group.
Our original hypothesis was that participation in prediction
markets would increase student enthusiasm for and knowledge
of the subject matter of an undergraduate political science course.
Therefore, we expected to see improvements among traders in
our primary dependent variables of interest: enthusiasm, outside
reading, and knowledge.
Unfortunately, all students reported lower levels of enthusi-
asm for the subject of the course, and traders in the treatment
group reported even lower levels of enthusiasm than their control
group counterparts. As the end of semester survey occurred shortly
before the ﬁnal exam, wewere not surprised to see an overall drop
in course enthusiasm. The ﬁrst six columns of table 2 report the
results of a within-group paired t-test indicating the signiﬁcance
of the changes within each group before and after the interven-
tion (or lack thereof, for the control group.) Speciﬁcally, we test
the null hypothesis that the diﬀerence between themeasure from
the beginning to the end of the semester is equivalent to zero.
Each star therefore indicates that the change is signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero at our preferred  0.05. For the control group,
the drop in enthusiasm and increase in reading of news fromother
countries both showed signiﬁcant within-group changes, and for
the treatment group, only the increase in reading was signiﬁcant.
The last column of table 2 shows the results of an independent
two-group t-test of the diﬀerences between the groups. This
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence between traders and nontraders was not
signiﬁcant for any of the key dependent variables. This means
that although some of the changes from the beginning to end of
the semester were signiﬁcant for each group, the changes in levels
between traders and nontraders was not. Nonetheless, the greater
drop in enthusiasm among traders versus nontraders is surpris-
ing and led us to ask further questions about the trader group.We
next decompose the treatment group into active participants to
gain a more ﬁne-grained perspective on the data driving these
results.
Indicators of Active Trading
The following section reports results only for students in the treat-
ment group (traders). Here, we diﬀerentiate between active trad-
ers and inactive traders to determine if there are diﬀerences
between students in the treatment group who chose to partici-
pate in themarket. Active traders are deﬁned as those who logged
in and executed at least one trade, as was required to receive the
cash payment. Inactive traders are those students in the treat-
ment group who never logged in. In the treatment group (those
randomly assigned to be traders), 45 students were active traders
and 22 were inactive traders. Of the active traders, only three
students actually executed only one trade and, of those, only
one picked up the cash incentive. Among the 42 students with
Table 2
Improvement in Key Dependent Variables over One Semester
QUESTION—CHANGES FROM
START TO END SURVEYS
NONTRADERS
START
NONTRADERS
END
NONTRADERS
DIFFERENCE
TRADERS
START
TRADERS
END
TRADERS
DIFFERENCE
DIFFERENCE-IN-
DIFFERENCE
(NON-TRADERS
MINUS TRADERS)
How interested are you in
world politics? ~1, completely
unenthusiastic—6,
completely enthusiastic!
5.6290 5.2903 −0.3387*
~|t | =1.8002
p = 0.0768!
5.6119 4.9701 −0.6418
~|t | = 3.1011
p = 0.0028!
0.3031
~|t | =1.0836
p = 0.2806!
Do you read news about the
politics of other countries at
least once a week in a newspaper
or on the internet?
0.6613 0.7313 0.0806*
~|t | =1.2981
p = 0.1991!
0.7419 0.8060 0.0746*
~|t | =1.6896
p = 0.0958!
0.0060
~|t | = 0.0790
p = 0.9372!
Quiz Scores ~mean percent
correct answers!
0.3031 0.3542 0.0511
~|t | = 2.1891
p = 0.0511!
0.3377 0.3936 0.0559
~|t |= 4.6728
p = 0.0559!
−0.0048
~|t | = 0.2108
p = 0.8334!
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multiple trades, the mean number of trades was 8.18.1 In this sec-
tion, we report values for the overall group of treated students,
and indicate diﬀerences between active and inactive traders in
parentheses unless otherwise indicated.
Active traders had higherMSLQ scores than did inactive trad-
ers ( Sxactive  3+7696, Sxinactive  3+4008, 6t 6  1+5051, p  0+1446),
although their score was comparable to the mean for the control
group (3.7228). It is possible that participation in the market is
related to self-regulatory cognitive strategies, and that participa-
tion in the prediction markets was seen as an additional meta-
cognitive strategy used to supplement course preparation.
We detected a possible gender bias among active traders that
may be worth considering when using prediction markets in a
classroom setting. First, recall that the class was 44% female, with
no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between students random-
ized into control and treatment groups. Of the 22 inactive traders,
12 were female and 10 were male; of the 45 active traders, 29 were
male and 16 were female. The proportion of female active traders
was slightly lower than the trader group as a whole, but the
diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant. In terms of number of
trades, there is a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence: The average
number of trades for male traders was 15.5172, but the average for
female traders was 6.125 (6t 6 0+3943, p 0+6941).
Another notable ﬁnding among active traders is that they
had a signiﬁcantly higher prior level of reading in the area. At
the start of the semester, 82% of those students who would even-
tually become active traders reported reading about the politics
of other countries at least once per week. By comparison, only
54% of inactive traders reported such reading, compared to
70% of the class overall. In other words, the students who
were already reading broadly at the start of the course were more
likely to trade actively in the market. As seen in table 3, by the
end of the semester, the class as a whole exhib-
ited a statistically signiﬁcant improvement on
this measure, with inactive traders actually mak-
ing the most gains. Inactive traders exhibited a
statistically signiﬁcant improvement of 18%.
Active traders improved their reading by 7%,
which is signiﬁcant at the   0.1 level, and
remained well ahead of other groups, with 84%
reporting this activity by the end of the term.
There was no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in improvement between active and inactive trad-
ers or traders (treatment) and nontraders
(control ).
The modal answer for nonparticipation
among inactive traders was “too busy,” with 13
out of 22 inactive traders providing this response.
The next most common answer, “not interested
in the topics,” was given by only four students.
When asked directly in a separate question, inac-
tive traders indicated being the busiest both at
the start and end of the term. At the same time,
inactive traders exhibited lower mean MSLQ
scores than either active traders or the class as a
whole. Recall that theMSLQ used here is a mea-
sure of student’s self-regulation about study hab-
its, and a higher score is positively correlatedwith
higher grades. The mean MSLQ score for inac-
tive traders was 3.4008, while themean for active
traders was 3.7697, and for the entire class was 3.6843. We note
that self-perceived levels of “busyness” may aﬀect student’s will-
ingness to participate in an educational experiment without a
direct impact on their coursework or grade, even if the “busyness”
is not necessarily directly connected with preparation for the
course.
The entire class showed statistically signiﬁcant improvement
in their quiz score results (see table 4). It is not possible from our
data to determine precisely which component of the improve-
ment was a direct result of trading. We do note, however, that,
despite starting with the lowest mean quiz scores, active traders
had the greatest improvement on their scores in the knowledge
quiz, increasing the mean percentage of correct answers from
32.96% to 38.68%, a statistically signiﬁcant 5.72% improvement.
Further, among treated students, the inactive traders’ improve-
ment was only borderline signiﬁcant (p 0+09). Although inac-
tive traders started with the highest mean quiz score, and ended
up with the highest scores, their amount of improvement was
about the same as the class as a whole, and their improvement
was not statistically signiﬁcant.
These results taken together indicate that the prediction mar-
kets may have some value in improving content learning for stu-
dents who are motivated by the instrument, but further
experiments are needed to investigate the extent to which they
enable learning beyond the speciﬁc topics of the markets they
trade in.
Motivations and Behavior of Active Traders
The following section only reports ﬁndings for students in the
group of active traders (N 45), deﬁned as those who logged in
and executed one or more trade. Active traders were asked to
report their reasons for participation. Percentages here add up to
Table 3
Reading about the Politics of Other Countries at Least
Once perWeek
SEMESTER
START
SEMESTER
END
DIFFERENCE (START-END)
WITHIN-GROUP t-TEST
Nontraders 0.6612 0.7419 0.0806
~|t | =1.2981
p = 0.1991!
Traders 0.7313 0.8059 0.0746
~|t | =1.6896
p = 0.0958!
Difference
(Non-Traders—Traders) independent
2-group t-test with unequal variance
0.0060
~|t | = 0.0790
p = 0.9372!
Active Traders 0.8222 0.8444 0.0222
~|t | = 0.4432
p = 0.6598!
Inactive Traders 0.5454 0.7272 0.1818*
~|t | = 2.1602
p = 0.0425!
Difference
(Inactive—Active) independent
2-group t-test with unequal variance
0.1596
~|t | =1.6291
p = 0.1119!
Total 0.6976 0.7751 0.0775*
Difference
~Start-End! within-group t-test
~|t | = 2.0670
p = 0.0408!
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greater than 100 as students were given the option to choose
multiple answers. Of the students who did trade in the experi-
ment, 68% reported that their reason for participating was that
they “wanted to win money,” and 44% of students were “inter-
ested in learning about the topics.” Some 20% were interested in
learning about decision markets, but only 17% wanted to improve
their understanding of world politics. Seventy-eight percent of
traders reported that the experiment seemed fun, and 56% stated
that it was challenging. Of these students, 80% found the exper-
iment relevant to the topic of the course in which the experi-
ment was conducted.
We also asked active traders if the experiment encouraged
them to read about market topics outside of class. This gives us
ﬁner-grained data than our survey question for all students, which
only asked whether students read some international news
sources. Students (51%) reported reading more about the Google/
China dispute, and 40% reported reading more about the Olym-
pics. Only 11% reported reading about the military or Palestinian
elections, and 9% reported reading about the elections in Haiti.
Overall, there was some evidence that the markets prompted
additional reading, but that it was not distributed evenly across
all the topics. This is consistent with the original design of our
experiment, in which we attempted to provide markets on a range
of topics to accommodate diﬀerent interests.
Trading Behavior
Of active traders 69% understood how to use the experimental
interface, and 67% found the instructions given by the researchers
to be clear.We asked students a categorical question on how they
made their trading decisions. Some (58%) stated that trading deci-
sionsweremade “based onpersonal beliefs,” followedby 51%based
on news reports. The smallest number of students reported mak-
ing trades based on the outcome they wanted (4%) or based on
the trades of others (i.e., the price reported on the graph—6%).
Forty percent of students believed that their predictionsweremore
correct than those of their classmates. This is in line with the
claim by Sunstein (2006) thatmarket trading encourages individ-
ual information processing and reporting, rather than group-
think or herd behavior.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL SCIENCE PEDAGOGY AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
AsWhitton(2007)warns,notallstudentswillberesponsivetointer-
active technological projects suchapredictionmarkets.Oneof our
moststrikingﬁndingsisthatactivetradershadasigniﬁcantlyhigher
prior level of reading than other students in the topics of themar-
kets, outside of their course requirements, both at the beginning
and end of the semesters. Another ﬁnding is students’ higher level
ofMLSQ characteristics, indicating students who havemore self-
regulatedstudyhabits.Thestudentswhodidactivelytradereported
that theyenjoyeddoingso, and that itprompted themtoreadmore
widely on some of themarket topics.These ﬁndings together hint
that prediction markets may be best used in a classroom of stu-
dentswhoarehighlymotivatedandalreadyengaged in the subject
matter. An elective upper-level undergraduate course or a gradu-
ate course may be more appropriate settings for using prediction
markets as an educational tool.
For reasons of fairness in our randomized study, we chose a
controlled set of market topics that were outside of the speciﬁc
topics studied in the class. One unanswered question from our
research involves how students would interact with a decision
market that ismore closely connected to their interests. For exam-
ple, it is possible to design the interface so that students can cre-
ate markets based on their own interests in certain topics of a
class. We asked students directly if they had the opportunity to
create their own market on any topic (for example, who will win
the NCAA championships), if they would do so, and 44% stated
that they would. It would also be interesting to conduct a future
study with markets linked to the course syllabus, for veriﬁcation
of whether more immediacy in the market topics would result in
learning gains.
Although this experiment was conducted in a class on world
politics, we believe our results may still be useful for an instructor
considering using prediction markets as an interactive teaching
tool for other courses, such as aUS campaigns and elections course,
especially in conjunctionwith the 2012 presidential elections. Fur-
thermore, the use of one or two narrowly focusedmarkets, such as
those used in the Iowa Electronic Markets, may lead to “thicker”
trading behavior, or more informative predictions than those
observed in our study.With these caveats, we encourage instruc-
tors to consider using prediction markets as a hands-on technol-
ogy supplement to traditional resources in political science courses.
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NOTES
A version of this work was presented at the 9th International Conference on Computer
Supported Collaborative Learning (CSCL): Connecting Computer Supported Collabora-
tive Learning to Policy and Practice, July 4–8, 2011, atThe University of Hong Kong.
1. With our market interface, a student could buy or sell either 10 units or 100
units at any time. It is therefore possible that a student would have to initiate
Table 4
Improvement in Knowledge Quiz Scores
by Group
START QUIZ
SCORE
END QUIZ
SCORE
DIFFERENCE
(START-END)
WITHIN-GROUP
t-TEST
Active Traders 0.3296 0.3868 0.0572*
~|t | = 2.6699
p = 0.0106!
Inactive Traders 0.3542 0.4074 0.0532
~|t | =1.7485
p = 0.0950!
Difference
(Inactive—Active)
independent 2-group
t-test with unequal
variance
−0.00397
~|t | = 0.1069
p = 0.9154!
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multiple trading actions in to move the price to precisely the right level, and so
we need to be careful about how we count trades.We use the following meth-
odology in counting trades: Any sequence of trading actions on the same
market by the same student within 1 minute was considered a single “trade”
for counting purposes. The results would be almost identical if we used a 10-
minute limit instead. The mean number of raw trading actions per active
trader was 30.47.
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